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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

JEFFERY RUSSELL FINLAYSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20000744-CA
Priority No. 2

:

Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant Jeffery
Russell Finlayson, ["Mr. Finlayson"], by and through his counsel of record, submits this
Petition for Rehearing of his appeal from a sentence for rape, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 (1999), and forcible sodomy, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403(2) (1999), in the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson,
Judge, presiding. Following briefing and oral argument, this Court issued its opinion in
State v. Finlayson, 2002 UT App 36, on 14 February 2002, affirming the sentence.1

SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
On appeal, the following rules, statutes, and constitutional provisions were
misapplied or misconstrued:

1

A copy of this Court's opinion is attached in Addendum A.

The Fifth Amendment:
.. . nor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . .
U.S. Const, amend. V.
Article 1, section 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
Utah Const., art. 1 § 7.
Utah Code Annotated section 77-18-l(6)(a):
. . . Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which
have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and
the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged
inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working days the
inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of
relevance and accuracy on the record.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (1999).
Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure:
The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.
Utah R.Crim. 22(e) (2001).
Rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless
otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of conviction or other order
is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order affirmed or modified shall
be executed.
Utah R.App. 30(b) (2001).
2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Considerations of due process, Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and Rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure support the
sentencing court's resentencing of Mr. Finlayson after one count of his three-count
conviction was reversed. Further, the court did not lack jurisdiction to perform this task.
As recognized by federal courts, a sentencing court usually "will craft a disposition in
which the sentences on the various counts form part of an overall plan." United States v.
Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1989). Accordingly, "whenever a reversal on
appeal undoes a sentencing plan, or even calls the plan into question, the district court
should be invited to resentence the defendant on all counts in order to achieve a rational,
coherent structure in light of the remaining convictions." United States v. Bentley, 850
F.2d 327, 328-30 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing cases). Because the number and severity of the
counts of a multi-count conviction affects the overall sentence, due process compels
resentencing when a conviction is partially reversed.
Under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a sentencing court
always has jurisdiction to correct an erroneous sentence. Utah R.Crim. 22(e) (2001). In
this case, the sentencing court did precisely that. After Mr. Finlayson's aggravated
kidnaping conviction was reversed, State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ^[35-37, 994 P.2d
1243, the court needed to correct the original sentence, judgment, and commitment
because it included an erroneous conviction.
The sentencing court's actions are further supported by Rule 30(b) of the Utah
3

Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 30(b) requires a district court to execute the judgment
of the appellate court. In reversing the aggravated kidnapping conviction, the Utah
Supreme Court did not give sentencing instructions or otherwise indicate how its
judgement affected the sentence. Finlavson, 2000 UT 10, ^[35-37. Thus, it fell to the
sentencing court to perform this task.
Finally, a harmlessness analysis does not apply to the sentencing court's failure to
comply with section 77-18-l(6)(a) of the Utah Code. Section 77-18-l(6)(a) requires a
sentencing court to resolve alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report
either by granting additional time for correction, or by making findings of relevance or
accuracy. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (1999). A harmlessness analysis has never
applied to violations of 77-18-l(6)(a) in the past,2 and such an analysis should not be
applied now. Importantly, the presentence investigation report is significant not only in
sentencing, but also in future hearings conducted by the Board of Pardons and Parole3
and even in other criminal cases.4 Thus, even if Mr. Finlayson's sentence was "fully
consistent with both the evidence and the gravity of the offenses," Finlayson, 2002 UT
App 36, this case should, at least, be remanded for findings required by section 77-18l(6)(a).

2

See State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, fl3-15, 6 P.3d 1133 (without applying harmlessness
analysis, court remanded for findings in accordance with section 77-18-1).
3

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(d) (1999).

4

Utah R.Evid. 404(b) (Supp. Oct. 2001).
4

ARGUMENT
I. CONSIDERATIONS OF DUE PROCESS AND RELEVANT RULES OF
PROCEDURE COMPEL A FINDING THAT THE SENTENCING COURT
HAD JURISDICTION TO RESENTENCE MR. FINLAYSON
In finding that "the trial court may not have had jurisdiction to resentence" Mr.
Finlayson, State v. Finlayson, 2002 UT App 36, this Court overlooked several points of
law. After Mr. Finlayson's conviction for Aggravated Kidnaping was reversed by the
Utah Supreme Court, State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,1J35-37, 994 P.2d 1243, the due
process provisions of the United States and Utah Constitutions required the sentencing
court to resentence him. Further, under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a sentencing court has jurisdiction to "correct an illegal sentence, or a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R.Crim. 22(e) (2001). Third,
Rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a trial court to execute the
judgment or order of an appellate court, Utah R.App. 30(b) (2001), and resentencing was
necessary for compliance.
Due process required resentencing in this case because the integrity of the original
sentence was compromised by the reversal of the Aggravated Kidnaping Charge. As the
federal courts have recognized:
[W]hen a defendant is found guilty on a multicount indictment, there is a
strong likelihood that the district court will craft a disposition in which the
sentences on the various counts form part of an overall plan. When the
conviction on one or more of the component counts is vacated, common
sense dictates that the judge should be free to review the efficacy of what
remains in light of the original plan, and to reconstruct the sentencing
architecture upon remand, within applicable constitutional and statutory
5

limits, if that appears necessary in order to ensure that the punishment still
fits both crime and criminal.
United States v. Pimienta-Redondo. 874 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1989). Specifically,
[I]f illegal sentences in the original package foil the district court's original
plans, the court may start anew and arrive at a punishment no more severe
in aggregate than the first. Our court has concluded that whenever a
reversal on appeal undoes a sentencing plan, or even calls the plan into
question, the district court should be invited to resentence the defendant on
all counts in order to achieve a rational, coherent structure in light of the
remaining convictions.
United States v. Bentlev. 850 F.2d 327, 328-30 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing cases).
The need to bring Mr. Finlayson's sentence into harmony with the number of
counts of his conviction and the severity of those counts is also inherent in Utah case law.
It is basic that a defendant is entitled to federal and state "due process protections during
sentencing to prevent procedural unfairness." State v. Gomez. 887 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah
1994). Part of due process protection is that a sentence should be based upon "accurate
and reasonably reliable information." State v. Weeks. 2000 UT App 273, f 8, 12 P.3d
110. When part of a multi-count conviction is reversed, the informational foundation of
the original sentence changes. Depending upon the circumstances, the justification for
imposing a sentence enhancement may be gone, one or more convictions may be gone,
the severity of the counts may be altered, or the applicable sentences themselves may
have changed. In each of these circumstances, the overall sentencing plan must be
reassessed to ensure "that the punishment still fits both crime and criminal." PimientaRedondo. 874 F.2d at 14.

6

In this case, due process mandated the reassessment of the overall sentencing plan
after one count of Mr. Finlayson's three-count conviction was reversed. There is nothing
to indicate that the aggravated kidnaping charge did not contribute to the overall
sentencing plan, or that the reversal of this charge did not alter the factors considered by
the sentencing court in pronouncing sentence. To the contrary, the original sentence
mandated that ten years of Mr. Finlayson's prison sentence must be served, and this was
based upon the aggravated kidnaping charge. R. 891 [911]. Resentencing was necessary
to allow the sentencing court to "resentence the defendant on all counts in order to
achieve a rational, coherent structure in light of the remaining convictions." Bentley, 850
F.2d at 328-30.
Even if nothing else needed to be done, the sentencing court needed to resentence
Mr. Finlayson in order to correct the original sentence, judgment, and commitment. The
original sentence contained an erroneous sentence for aggravated kidnapping, and Rule
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the sentencing court to "correct an
illegal sentence . . . at any time." Utah R.Crim. 22(e) (2001). There is nothing to indicate
that this case constituted an exception to the rule.
Finally, resentencing was necessary under Rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. This rule indicates:
If a judgment of conviction is reversed, a new trial shall be held unless
otherwise specified by the court. If a judgment of conviction or other order
is affirmed or modified, the judgment or order affirmed or modified shall
be executed.

7

Utah R.App. 30(b) (2001). Under this Rule, the sentencing court was obligated to
resentence Mr. Finlayson in order to execute the judgment of the Utah Supreme Court.
After reversing one count of the three-count conviction, the Court did not give sentencing
instructions or otherwise indicate how its judgment affected sentence. Finlayson, 2000
UT 10, f 35-37. It therefore fell to the sentencing court to perform this task pursuant to
Rule 30(b).
In light of due process, Rule 22(e), and Rule 30(b), the sentencing court's
rensentencing of Mr. Finlayson should not be censured by this Court, and a finding of
jurisdiction should be issued.

II. BECAUSE A HARMLESSNESS ANALYSIS DOES NOT APPLY TO A
SENTENCING COURT'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 7718-1. THE RESULT OF THIS APPEAL SHOULD NOT DEPEND UPON A
FINDING OF PREJUDICE
The crux of this appeal is the sentencing court's failure to make findings of
accuracy or relevancy regarding Mr. Finlayson's objections to information in the
presentence investigation report. The sentencing court's oversight violated section 77-181 of the Utah Code, which provides:
. . . Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which
have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and
the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged
inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working days the
inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of
relevance and accuracy on the record.

8

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (1999). If a sentencing court fails to comply with this
statute, the sentence must be reversed and the case remanded for compliance with section
77-18-l(6)(a) and resentencing. State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1075 (Utah 1993)
(superseded on other grounds). Alternatively, the case must be remanded for 77-18l(6)(a) findings. State v. Veteto. 2000 UT 62, fl5, 6 P.3d 1133; State v. Jaeger. 1999 UT
1,145, 973 P.2d 404.
In any case, violations of this statute are not subject to a harmlessness analysis.5 A
harmlessness analysis has never applied to violations of 77-18-l(6)(a), nor should it
apply. To show that a sentencing court's failure to comply with 77-18-l(6)(a) was
harmful, a defendant would have to show that, even though the sentencing court
reviewed the presentence investigation report and used it in pronouncing sentence, the
court did not rely upon it in pronouncing sentence. "[T]he burden of proving a negative is
almost impossible to meet," Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1073, and it is unfair and unreasonable
to impose this burden in these circumstances.
The presentence investigation report follows a defendant throughout his term of
incarceration. It is used by the Board of Pardons and Parole in evaluating a defendant at

5

See Veteto. 2000 UT 62,113-15 (without applying harmlessness analysis, court
remanded for findings in accordance with section 77-18-1); Jaeger. 1999 UT 1,141-45 (without
applying harmlessness analysis, court remanded for findings in accordance with section 77-181); Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1072-73 (without applying harmlessness analysis, court reversed
sentence and remanded for findings and resentencing). See also Criminal Law, 21A Am Jur 2d §
806 ("On-the-record compliance with [the requirement that findings must be made] is
mandatory, and where absent, a reviewing court will remand for findings or determinations
pursuant to the Rule 32(c)(3)(D).")
9

hearings and for parole eligibility.6 It affects the programs and therapy for which a
defendant qualifies. Id It may even be relevant if a defendant is later charged with or
convicted of another crime.7 Thus, even if errors in a presentence investigation report did
not prejudice the sentence itself, a remand is required for findings of relevance or
accuracy. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1,1(45.
Further, the record shows in this case that the sentencing court received the
presentence investigation report, reviewed the report, and relied upon it in pronouncing
sentence. R. 1071 [5, 14, 18]. There is nothing to indicate that the sentencing court
somehow overlooked the Official Version of the Offense located at the beginning of the
report, R. 929 [2], or that the court did not in any way rely upon it. In fact, the court
indicated its general reliance upon the report, R. 1071 [18], and indicated it had reviewed

6

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(d) ("The contents of the presentence investigation
report, including any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404^/9 ? 9)
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided
by rule of the Judicial Counsel or for use by the department.") (emphasis added).
7

See Utah R.Evid. 404(b) (Supp. Oct. 2001) (Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in
advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial."). See also State v. Decorso, 1999 UT
57, ^[27, 993 P.2d 837 (Evidence of prior burglary at Draper Payless Shoe Store was properly
admitted to establish identity of victim's killer where two burglaries were remarkably similar
and aspects of the crimes suggested the same perpetrator had committed both); State v. Baker,
963 P.2d 801, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (Evidence of prior sexual conduct with defendant's wife
was properly admitted where the conduct "was strikingly similar to the conduct to which H.H.
testified she was subjected . . . . " ) .
10

the facts of the case, R. 1071 [5], which were summarized in the Official Version of the
Offense. Thus, inaccuracies in the report justify, at least, a remand for findings as
required by section 77-18-1.
Notwithstanding, this Court did not reverse the sentence or even remand for
findings in accordance with section 77-18-1. Instead, this Court based its affirmance on a
finding that Mr. Finlayson was not prejudiced by the sentencing court's "failure to
resolve inconsistencies between the trial testimony and the official version of the offense
in the pre-sentence investigation report." Finlayson, 2002 UT App 36. This Court also
indicated that "[t]he sentence imposed is fully consistent with both the evidence and the
gravity of the offense." Id.
However, whether the sentence is consistent with the evidence and gravity of the
offense is not at issue. At issue is the sentencing court's failure to resolve factual
inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, as required by section 77-18-1, and
how this oversight affected Mr. Finlayson's sentencing and will affect his future board
evaluations. This case should, at least, be remanded for such findings.

CONCLUSION
In light of the above, Mr. Finlayson respectfully requests rehearing of his appeal,
and a reversal of his sentence with a remanded to the sentencing court for appropriate
findings and resentencing. Alternatively, Mr. Finlayson requests a remand for findings in
accordance with section 77-18-l(6)(a).
11
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Paulette Stagg
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State of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 20000744-CA
F I L E D
(February 14, 2002)

Jeffery Russell Finlayson,
Defendant and Appellant

2002 UT App 36

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Attorneys

Heather Johnson and Robert K. Heineman, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Davis.
BENCH, Judge:
"If a judgment of conviction or other order is affirmed or
modified, the judgment or order affirmed or modified shall be
executed." Utah R. App. P. 30(b). Because Defendant's
convictions for rape and forcible sodomy were affirmed on appeal,
the trial court may not have had jurisdiction to resentence
Defendant. See, e.g., State v. Montova, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991) ("To determine whether [defendant's] appeal of his
resentencing is properly before this court, we must determine
whether the initial sentence was valid. If it was valid, the
trial court would have had no further subject matter jurisdiction
to resentence [defendant].").
In any event, even if the trial court had jurisdiction to
resentence, Defendant was not prejudiced by the court's failure
to resolve inconsistencies between the trial testimony and the
official version of the offense in the pre-sentence investigation
report. Judge Wilkinson heard the evidence at trial and
expressed a recollection of the trial evidence when he

resentenced Defendant. The sentence imposed is fully consistent
with both the evidence and the gravity of the offenses.

Accordingly, the trial court's sentencing order is affirmed.

Russell W. Bench, Judge
WE CONCUR:

L
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